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Book Reviews 
VOICE TERMINAL ECHO: Pastmodernism and English Renaissance Texts by 
Jonathan Goldberg. New York: Methuen, 1986. Pp. x + 194. $26.00, cloth; 
$13.95, paper. 
Postmodernism. In a small theater, a voice (recorded?) tells the story of a 
life, but is interrupted by glitches, erasures, repetitions. Other voices (the 
same voice?) enter with other pieces of narrative (the same story?), The 
voices are audible in combination, disrupting each other, echoing, overlap-
ping, creating new fragments of meaning out of seemingly random juxtaposi-
tions. The narrative continuum has been shattered by the multiplicity of 
competing vocal channels. For the audience (those still listening) there is dis-
orientation, also exhilirating release-a lifting of the burden of linearity. Jon-
athan Goldberg's new book functions like the postmodern theatrical event, 
performing upon the collective voice of traditional literary criticism the same 
disruptive dispersal, providing a comparable liberation from time-honored 
continuities. I found myself almost wishing that the book had been cast in a 
more immediately performative mode-marketed in handy playable cassette 
form so that we could hear the cacophony of fragmented voices or, better 
yet, staged as a single, unrepeatable theatrical event. 
Written and bound, with the author's name dutifully inscribed upon it, 
VOICE TERMINAL ECHO is tamed by its participation in the authorizing ritu-
als of scholarly publication. But not tamed altogether. Despite the increasing 
familiarity of postmodemism, Goldberg acknowledges that not all readers 
will take kindly to his method. He anticipates the "horror of so-called hu-
manistic criticism which has not failed to see itself threatened but also, more 
disconcertingly, the horror of socially engaged criticism which has preferred 
to regard poststructuralism as a new formalism rather than confront its own 
sentimentality" (p. ix). The book's polemical thrust is therefore twofold. He 
joins the many recent attacks on the New Criticism, on what Jonathan Dolli-
more has called the "transcendent subject" and on an aesthetics of "har-
monic idealism," but Goldberg sets his work apart through his insistence that 
a critical praxis of textual indeterminacy is not an evasion of history but in-
stead radically historicist. He uses the disorienting methods of postmodem-
ism to effect an opening into the pluralism and unsettledness of texts in the 
Renaissance, before the stabilizing fictions of authorship, which we have re-
cently begun to find burdensome, had first taken hold. 
To cast Goldberg's argument in such discursive terms is, of course, to vio-
late its performative nature, its assaultive "refusals of the tactics of making 
sense" (p. 7). He suggests that the best guide to the book, multiple, fractured, 
might be its index. But at the same time, the book allows-covertly encour-
ages-the assemblage of furtive fragments· and the discovery of pattern. He 
begins with Marvell's "Nymph complaining for the death of her Faull"-an 
effective entrypoint since it is a text whose simultaneous resonance and im-
penetrability few readers would dispute. In "The Garden" and in Marvell's 
poetry generally, the creative act entails "annihilating all that's made." 
"The Nymph complaining" is deeply self-referential, Marvell's "most e1ab-
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orated version" of the "moment of creative annihilation" (p. 14). The 
voice of the Nymph articulates the situation of a poet in that its very entry 
into language defines a prior loss-of a fawn, a garden, some mythic origi-
nal discursive site where, the voice plaintively assures us, language, mean-
ing, existed without self-negation. The poem's final image-the weeping 
statue of the Nymph wearing away its substance through the very act of 
"engraving" tears upon its own breast-defines the discursive space of the 
poem and of its reading, in which meaning is constituted only insofar as 
"text is worn away" (p. 36). 
The following chapters are placed in precise chronological order, inter-
estingly enough-as though to provide a stable ground for the pyrotech-
nics of dispersal-and take up in turn Spenser, Shakespeare, Herbert, and 
Milton. In The Shepheardes Calender voices that could be associated with the 
poet are scattered over different, antithetical figures; the process expands into 
the woodcuts and into the annotations of E. K., who "may be an invention 
for this text; he is, at any rate, made posible by it" (p. 64). In the psychic 
economy of The Shepheardes Calender, even when Spenser appears to take on 
a humanist public role as poet to the Queen, his very attempt to rest "in 
fayre Elisa" means surrendering authorial identity so that she becomes the 
producer of the text and the poet is silenced. This negative economy is, in 
Goldberg's analysis, the enactment of a historical dilemma-the place (no 
place) of the poet in a cultural system that holds the poet for naught, in 
which the very pinnacle of success-achieving the favorable notice of the 
Queen-dissolves authorship under Authority. 
In the early Shakespeare, the dispersal of identity is easier, closer to a 
mode of play. Goldberg offers a brilliant Lacanian reading of The Two Gen-
tlemen of Verona that explores the play's unacknowledged circuitry of letters 
and desire. Its characters, often dismissed as wooden, are indeed wood or 
woods (like Ben Jonson's Silva), haunted by echo; they themselves are "in-
struments of the letter," already written. "Similitude is their being" (p. 77). 
Goldberg's analysis of chains of displacement in Two Gentlemen is evocative 
for the sonnets, Titus Andronicus, and Cymbeline (which he discusses) and for 
other early plays like Love's Labor's Lost (which he doesn't), in which human 
identity is also constituted as text and wafted away in the "sweet smoke of 
rhetoric." Goldberg's claim is that Renaissance "character" is not identity in 
the late nineteenth-century Bradleyan sense but echo: so Hamlet dies, articu-
lating "I am dead." In that "impossible sentence" a fiction of internality is 
evoked, but as its own ghost, in the same way that Hamlet's father had spo-
ken from the grave to be "written" on Hamlet's tablets: "Meet it is I set it 
down." Voice is inscribed "within the iterability of writing" (p. 100). 
The Shakespeare section ends in a solemn parody of benediction: texts are 
spoken in the sacred name of fathers, sons, and "the ghost of the sovereign 
author." It is a suitable introit into the iconoclastic Herbert chapter that fol-
lows, and a warning-not Procul profani but Procul sacri. Critics of The Tem-
ple have almost always been content to stay within the text's overt 
thematization of the giving up of self and author-ity in the name of a tran-
scendent God. Goldberg disrupts this mode of criticism and its "repeated ex-
ercises of faith" (p. 101) by resisting its essentialist drift. In The Temple, God 
exists only "in writing. In the dead letter. An otherness without transcend-
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ence. Literally" (p. 107). Here, as throughout the book, there is new attention 
to the original presentation of the text. The Temple was announced on the 
1633 title page as 
THE 
TEMPLE. 
Sacred Poems 
and 
Private Eja-
culations. 
By Mr. George Herbert. 
Psal. 29. 
In his Temple doth every 
man speak his honour. 
Goldberg points out, quite rightly, that there is something odd about this-it 
is time for us to look more closely at such seemingly familiar arrays. Part of 
the oddity, at least from a post-Victorian perspective, is the almost inevitable 
sexual connotation of "Eja-culation" (used in the sexual sense, according to 
the OED, as early as 1603). If we refuse to pass demurely over the obvious 
(and Goldberg won't allow us to) Herbert's collection becomes, among other 
things, a "space of dissemination" for resowing the disowned seed of interi-
ority, identity. Herbert is always "caught within the father's no," yet enact-
ing, sometimes, as in "The Bag:' through disrupted narratives, the dispersal 
and fragmentation of the Father's voice. 
In his preface, Goldberg suggests that his discussion will allow the emer-
gence of differences between seventeenth-century authors and sixteenth-
century writers in their relationship to textuality (pp. ix-x). In Herbert (also in 
Hamlet), authorship, authority over one's own text, has become a visible pos-
sibility and a problem. In Milton, who is usually treated as the sovereign au-
thor par excellence, the idea of such authority is everywhere. Much Milton 
teaching and criticism used to consist-still consists-in worshipful descants 
upon the poet-priest's infallible Voice. Because of that continuing traditional-
ism, Goldberg's analysis in the Milton chapter is particularly welcome. "Mil-
ton's Warning Voice: Considering Preventive Measures" argues that 
authority in Milton's texts comes not through the voice's compelling pres-
ence, "the present of a self-conceiving," but rather through its promise of 
what is to come but cannot arrive. "The place where Milton is" is "waiting, 
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positioned in a career always about to begin" (p. 124). He speaks always pre-
vented (one of his favorite words), within the impediment of its not yet being 
time. "Pre-vented, he comes before himself, lodges the voice within the ant-
ecedence in which, not being his own person, he can speak in the person of 
the truth that he conceives conceives him" (p. 125). This paradoxical formu-
lation comes close to accounting for the peculiar deadness of Tradition as it is 
encoded in Miltonic texts, at least in the perception of many readers of the 
1980's. Our interest in Milton lies elsewhere, and Goldberg's short-circuiting 
of the relentlessly demanding Voice helps free Milton's texts for other kinds 
of analysis. Interesting things happen in this part of Goldberg's book: a can-
onical line emerges through strategies of evasion-Spenser, Shakespeare, 
Milton. In scattered patches, Goldberg begins to assert more discursive con-
trol over the discussion, as though his own authority as a reader-critic is 
fueled by the Miltonic thrust toward textual ownership. And yet, particularly 
toward the end, as though to fend off the nascent consolidation of continuity 
and authority, the voice of VOICE TERMINAL ECHO becomes increaSingly 
fractured, attaining a curious lyricism through the breaking of sentences into 
chains of vivid phrases, suggesting new combinations through its atomization 
of conventional critical discourse. It is an appropriate conclusion to a dazzling 
display. 
But how are we to read this book, presented on the one hand as postmod-
emist performance-a dance upon the dead bones of authorship-yet on the 
other hand as a work of literary criticism, part of a more conservative dis-
course accompanied by the usual statements of intent on the part of the au-
thor-critic, the citation of other voices, the validating mark of footnotes? 
Much as Hamlet states, impossibly, "I am dead," Goldberg announces the 
dissolution of his authority over his own text, or rather, perhaps, announces 
his authority as dissolution: "The voice on these pages is not singly deter-
mined to a procedure of logical demonstration. Multiple and fractured, it re-
sponds to texts and recounts them, pursuing and permitting disseminative 
practice" (p. 4). Like other varieties of postmodemism, Goldberg's performa-
tive dispersal is at least rhetorically dependent on the conventionalized uni-
ties it disrupts. There would be no release of energy without a prior 
containment (and for that reason, the exhilirating force of the book may not 
exist for those who have not known what went before). In the Renaissance, 
iconoclasts were careful to preserve the visibility of the sacred image beneath 
their slashes of obliteration. So, in Goldberg, we "(read under erasure: itself, 
its, its own, is)" (p. 32). 
All of which is to suggest that VOICE TERMINAL ECHO is indeed histori-
cism, for all its textualization of history, in spite of (because of) its refusal to 
grant historicism a separate, protected space. Its author invokes recent struc-
turalist and poststructuralist methodologies, but piecemeal, bending and in-
terweaving models to serve his detailed exploration of the vagaries of 
particular texts. As we have already noted, by refusing to assent to the nor-
malizing procedures of standard editorial practice, he also helps clear the 
ground for fresh reading. It can be objected that his stance as one who reads 
after the "death of the Author" inverts the Renaissance textual situation he 
seeks to elucidate. Post-identity is not quite the same as pre-identity: his de-
sire to avoid a hermeneutics of progress causes him at times to describe as 
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scattering what might otherwise be interpreted as motions toward collection. 
I am thinking in particular of his bleak discussion of Spenser, in which the 
poet "scatters death" but the "place" of Spenserian poetry is "recirculation." 
Rather than the continuing re-enactment of extinction, we might just as well 
view this as a compulsive thrust toward identity expressed through Spenser's 
continual throwing himself back into creation (pace Freud, who is on account 
of his positivist bias a strange figure for Goldberg to invoke). Like the texts it 
discusses, Goldberg's text can only achieve its own articulation, its full brilli-
ance, through the erosion of what has gone before. But that is less his pecu-
liar flaw than the condition of writing itself, at least as he portrays it. In 
addition to providing a rich, turbulent array of ideas, images, and beginnings, 
VOICE TERMINAL ECHO is, in its uncompromising self-placement on the 
tremulous line of self-contradictionl as lucid and clear-cut an enactment of 
the postmodem critical dilemma as we are likely to be offered. For that rea-
son, and for many others, it should be of interest to readers well beyond the 
area of English Renaissance studies. 
University of Wisconsin-Madison Leah S. Marcus 
Reflections on Gender and Science by Evelyn Fox Keller. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1985. Pp. 193. $20.95. 
Feminist inquiries into science have occurred on two fronts. The first is an 
inquiry into the status of women in science (their problems of entry, promo-
tion and funding) which has led to critiques not only of sexism in the profes-
sion but of basic problems in the ways girls are socialized away from such 
careers. A second inquiry, one which Evelyn Fox Keller labels radical, probes 
the scientific enterprise itself as in part a manifestation of gender ideology. 
This critique finds that science as it has come to be defined epistemolOgically 
in the West is masculinist in its structures. 
Reflections on Gender and Science will surely be viewed as a central state-
ment within such a radical inquiry. Its proposals are directed to fellow scien-
tists. I would like, instead, to comment briefly on some of the implications 
this book has for other disciplines. Keller's rigorous argument should be un-
derstood in a context much larger than that of departments of science, for her 
book should qUickly establish itself as a central text in feminist theory. My 
interest, however, is to locate it elsewhere as well: seventeenth century 
studies. 
Keller's "argument" is as much a reading of history as it is of science, and 
"argument" is surely the mode of her discourse. No wonder that one of her 
most surprising and far-reaching readings is her essay on Bacon, another 
writer who used "argument" as a mode for talking about science. In the end, 
each of them proposes sciences which at the time of each's writing are not 
yet practices. Two differences, however, separate Keller from the older pole-
micist. First, she brings to her argument her experience of the laboratory, as a 
mathematical biologist who has done primary research in theories of aggre-
gation in cellular slime mold. Second, the project she proposes grows not 
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only out of her debate with the dominant science of her culture, as Bacon's 
did also with his, but out of her experience with the failures of that dominant 
science in laboratory experiences. The elegance of her argument arises in 
part, therefore, from a proposed project whose outlines are already shaping 
themselves in practice-a practice which already points to success in the 
work of Barbara McClintock. Keller marshalls rich historical and psychologi-
cal contexts to strengthen her argument, for despite its seeming appearance 
as a set of autonomous essays, this is a rigorously unified volume. 
The book is divided into three sections of three essays each. The first 
group argues that the founding of modem science in the West, at the period 
of its origins, made choices which gave to the shape of its methods of inquiry 
and its epistemology a distinctively masculinist orientatioin. The essay on 
Plato's epistemology argues that "knowing" has ancient roots in erotic and 
sexual metaphors, and that Plato's solution to the sex/eros nexus was to 
sever radically the sexual act from eros, which becomes the desire for and 
love of pure knowing. This severance in tum split mind from body. Platon-
ism erected an epistemology which privileged mind as the agent of logos at 
the expense of body. Logos in tum was a shared site of mind and nature; the 
two could meet-perfectly-but only when mind was freed absolutely from 
bodily desires and needs. 
In the second essay, Keller turns to the sexual metaphors of Bacon's sci-
ence. In many respects Bacon maintains the Platonic mind/body split, but, 
more importantly, defines a new and thoroughly anti-Platonic split between 
the rational mind and a nature that is no longer seen as united with the lo-
gos. This split is described by Bacon in sexual imagery. In The Masculine Birth 
of Time, Bacon states, "I am come in very truth leading to you Nature with all 
her children to bind her to your service and make her your slave" (trans. by 
Farrington, p. 197). Bacon's metaphor reads two ways: masculine mind can 
coerce, force, even rape an objectified, feminized nature to make her reveal 
her secrets, or, ideally, it can wed her. This marriage is described as a chaste 
one of complementary, but opposed, sexual opposites. 
The third historical essay looks at the witchcraft debates of the 1640s and 
1650s. These debates formed part of the background for the founding of the 
Royal Society in London, for many of the founders participated in the de-
bates. A revival of Paracelsianism in the 1640s proposed a sexual image of 
nature in opposition to the empiricist discourse rooted in Bacon and Des-
cartes. Paracelsian Nature was not an objectified female body upon which 
masculine rationalism must pit itself; it was a dynamic interactive system of 
simultaneous masculine and feminine principles poised in eternal balance 
(not unlike the yin and yang of Taoism). The triumph of Baconian masculin-
ist science with the founding of the Royal Society was not, therefore, an 
event of determinist progress as it has traditionally been viewed; it was an 
historical event in which a particular subject/object relation defined within 
particular discursive traditions won out over an opposing model. 
The second trio of essays focuses upon a psychological analysis of ego for-
mation. In "Gender and Science," she analyzes the classic object relations 
model of ego formation. Ego autonomy is valued to the degree with which it 
attains objectivity-subjectivity being associated with various kinds of ego 
dependency. She concludes that objectivity remains stamped by the interper-
Criticism, Vol. XXVIII, No.4: Book Reviews 465 
sonal drama through which it was learned. Given the polarization of mascu-
line and feminine, "objectivity, properly speaking a human goal, becomes 
construed as objectivism, a masculine goal, whereas subjectivity becomes 
construed as subjectivism, a feminine perogative" (p. 71). 
The second essay of the group, "Dynamic Autonomy: Objects and Sub-
ject," is the keystone piece of the book's entire argument. In it, Keller ana-
lyzes the relations between objectivity, power and domination. She finds the 
psychological model of objectivity is replicated in modern science's own tra-
ditional (Baconian) definitions of its twin goals-knowledge and power. Her 
critique of this power-oriented objectivity draws upon those revisionists 
within object relations psychology who have studied pathologies of ego-
rigidity, among others the rape mentality. This inquiry has led to a revised 
model of ego-formation itself-a model formulated around a concept of "dy-
namic autonomy," not absolute objectivity and separation. "Dynamic auton-
omy" allows the subject to partake in relatedness without losing its identity 
as separate. Such a subject's negotiation of tensions within flexible, even 
permeable, boundaries between self and other is the hallmark of its dyna-
mism. Keller concludes, "tension is not the same as opposition, and the pur-
pose of this analysis has been to understand the ways in which our own 
psychosocial experience-above all, the disjunction of male from female-
leads to a bifurcation between autonomy and intimacy, separation and 
connection, power and love" (p. 113). 
The third essay in this group, leads the reader back to science. "Dynamic 
autonomy" as a revised model of ego-maturity is now placed in relation to 
nature. This dynamic ego seeks to "know" nature through a newly consti-
tuted "dynamic objectivity" -an objectivity which itself can negotiate perme-
able boundaries between the scientist and her object of study. Specifically, 
"dynamic objectivity" utilizes the epistemological model of McClintock who 
worked out a methodology which she described as a "feel for the organism" 
-an empathetic entry into the processes of the object of study. 
The last group of essays specifically examines applications of "dynamic ob-
jectivity" as a praxis, not just a prospectus. The essay on quantum mechanics 
argues that the double-bind of all current models may well be the result of 
the questions which tradition has taught physicists to ask. Keller looks at the 
metaphor of law as applied to nature. She suggests that a physics which is 
pervaded by legalistic discourse may also be blinded by the control that that 
discourse exerts over its ability to formulate innovative hypotheses. In place 
of a nature governed by laws, Keller offers McClintock's concept of "order" 
and invites her readers to entertain "a conception of nature orderly in its 
complexity rather than lawful in its simplicity" (p. 136). 
The second essay in this group reports Keller's work in the theory of aggre-
gation in cellular slime mold. Her struggle in the laboratory to restructure 
hypotheses after those conceptualized in terms of master molecule theories 
were found to fail, was finally vindicated when she was able to reorganize 
her description as one "emerging from an interest in order rather than law" 
(p. 138). The collection concludes with a discussion of the career of Mc-
Clintock. (Keller has written her biography: A Feeling for the Organism: The 
Life and Work of Barbara McClintock. New York: Freeman, 1983.) Although 
McClintock's lonely and ill-funded research has been belatedly vindicated by 
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her profession, particularly after her reception of the Nobel Prize, the impact 
and implications of her example are yet to be fully understood. Keller con-
cludes this essay with both caution and optimism, remarking: 
However, we need to remember that, as long as success in science does 
not require self-reflection, the undermining of masculinist or other 
ideological commitments is not a sufficient guarantee of change. But 
nature itself is an ally that can be relied upon to provide the impetus 
for real change: nature's responses recurrently invite reexamination of 
the terms in which our understanding of science is constructed. Paying 
attention to those responses-"listening to the material" -may help us 
to reconstruct our understanding of science in terms horn out of the di-
verse spectrum of human experience rather than out of the narrow 
spectrum that our culture has labeled masculine. (pp. 175-76) 
A short Epilogue states specific .proposals for science already implicit in the 
nine essays of the book. 
For Keller, nature is an object of knowledge, the knowing of which is 
shaped by discursive traditions-our culture's ways of talking about science. 
The excitement of her argument arises from her exposure of science as dis-
course, not to denigrate it, but rather to further its role in the definition and 
transmission of knowledge. This critique is centered in her reading of the his-
torical event which is the founding of the West's subject/object relationship 
-an event located in the Seventeenth Century. 
In the wake of the work of Michel Foucault, the origin of the individual 
subject in history has been fixed within the Seventeenth Century. Keller's es-
says on Bacon and the Royal Society confirm the Foucauldian epistemic chro-
nology. Alongside the inquiry into the origin of subjective selfhood has been 
a parallel inquiry into the rise of the modem gender system. Indeed, the two 
inquiries are often indistinguishable. Keller's essay on Bacon adds to this en-
terprise because her critique of Bacon's sexual metaphor from the perspective 
of object relations psychology allows us to see that metaphor as socially con-
structed and in the service of an emerging masculinist ideology. Likewise, her 
reading of the debates which prefigured the founding of the Royal Society 
shows that the gender system which triumphed in conjunction with empiri-
cist epistemology was not inevitable, but rather the result of competing mod-
els, the masculinist model over-ruling the Paraclesian androgynous one. 
These readings mark significant contributions to the current enterprise of de-
constructing traditional versions of progressive history. 
I must also comment on Keller's trenchant style. The forward movement of 
her argument in each essay never loses momentum. The result is a slender 
volume rich in detail but always focused on demonstrated conclusions. To 
add significantly to current discussions in fields as diverse as science, the his-
tory of science, the history of ideas, feminist theory, object relations psychol-
ogy and seventeenth-century studies bespeaks Keller's ability to scrutinize 
discourse systems rather than to be "written" by them; to do so as trench-
antly and with as little excess baggage as she does adds pleasure to a reader's 
experience of her "argument." 
Johnson C. Smith University Donald N. Mager 
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Dreadful Pleasures: An Anatomy of Modern Horror by James B. Twitchell. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1985. Pp. viii + 353. $18.95. 
This lengthy, detailed book by a professor of English at the University of 
Florida proposes to examine an adolescent rite de passage going on under-
neath our oblivious adult noses every weekend. Primitive cultures offer their 
young a variety of elaborate and generally terrifying initiation rituals de-
signed to propel them from childhood into adulthood. We modem Western-
ers, Twitchell claims, offer our adolescents horror movies to accomplish the 
same goal. Twitchell draws an analogy between what Bettelheim says fairy 
tales do for the very young-namely, prepare them for the anxieties of sepa-
ration from the mother-and what horror movies do for their older siblings: 
prepare them for the "anxieties of reproduction," These films, he maintains, 
help adolescents move from genetically useless onanism to a mature reprod-
uctive sexuality, show adolescents how to avoid making horrible reproduc-
tive mistakes whose issue are monsters, make incestuous pairings taboo 
(more about this later), and generally insure the "social stability of the cul-
ture." 
Those adults who have sat bleary-eyed through the television re-runs of 
some of these movies or who are accustomed to complain that Hollywood 
makes films, and bad ones, too, only for adolescents these days, will proba-
bly think that Twitchell's claims for the horror movie are too large, too "seri-
ous" and "elevated." And certainly there are faults to find in. Dreadful 
Pleasures. His assertion that there is a "concussive family romance" lurking at 
the heart of every horror movie is simply too reductive. He contradicts him-
self over important points. For example, he asserts that only a psychological 
reading of horror fiction-movies and novels-makes any sense. But at the 
same time, he agrees with Freud's conclusion that certain forms of art, the 
Gothic included, resist psychoanalytic interpretation. Impatient with critics 
who make judgments about a horror myth by looking at only one version of 
it (one Dracula movie, for instance, and not the entire genus), Twitchell nev-
ertheless does something similar in his book. He claims that his theories ap-
ply to all horror movies. Yet he discusses only those films embodying three 
horror motifs: the vampire, the "hulk with no name" (e.g., Frankenstein's 
monster), and the werewolf or "transformation monster." Other horror mov-
ies he blithely dismisses, saying they will not last, they are too topical, they 
cannot be told more than once and thus do not interest him, and so on. One 
cannot avoid the suspicion, however, that he has eliminated them from his 
discussion because they do not fit his theories. Finally, fully half of Dreadful 
Pleasures is given over to a detailed examination of scores of Dracula, Fran-
kenstein and werewolf movies. The careful recital of the ins and outs of their 
plots and the scholarly mention of the minute variations on a theme fre-
quently make for tedious reading. (Perhaps it made for tedious writing, too; 
sometimes Twitchell makes small factual and interpretive mistakes.) 
Still, it is hard not to applaud Twitchell's grave attention to his subject. He 
is one of a new generation of critics and scholars who insist that popular cul-
ture is worthy of serious study and not, as many academicians would have it, 
"just junk." It might, at first glance, seem surprising that we would unwit-
tingly trust the passing along of crucial sexual information to low-brow, op-
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portunistic Hollywood filmmakers, but when we consider America's 
Puritanical roots-its reticence even today over sexual education of the 
young-our surprise may fade. Nor should it seem unlikely that such appar-
ently paltry entertainment has things in common with the sacred ceremonies 
found in human cultures as far back as they go. Who, after all, is more in the 
myth-making business than Hollywood? That the myths Hollywood gener-
ates represent debased versions of "the real thing"-Le., the "sacred" truths 
-is undeniable. But what religious rituals (for surely sexual initiation is, or 
was, connected to religion) are not debased in the secular and scientific West? 
Following a conventional practice, Twitchell begins his discussion by 
drawing a distinction between horror and terror. He is only interested in the 
former. Terror art, he claims, takes its frightening images from the "real" 
world, the world of actuality; horror art takes its from dreams and night-
mares, from the psyche-indeed (here, Twitchell sounds rather like Jung) 
from the collective psyche. In addition, whether novel or film, terror art has a 
sense of closure, an end; horror art does not. The monster, the "it" at hor-
ror's center, can never be got under control; it can never he satisfactorily ex-
plained. However frightening, the carriers of terror are not "uncanny," are 
not marvelous, nor are they free of the laws which govern organic life. You 
can kill a terror "monster" in a conventional way; it is imprisoned by the 
same biology we are. 
In passing, Twitchell notes the emergence and popularity over the last 20 
years (30 would be more accurate) of the "psycho-horrors" -films like Psy-
cho, Repulsion and Whatever Happened to Baby Jane-and the invasion-from-
afar movie, whether the "afar" be defined as extraterrestrial or merely some 
remote comer of our earth. Included in this category are what might be 
called "violated nature strikes back" movies. Hitchcock's The Birds sets the 
pattern, he says, for the latter type. But surely Them!, a movie which is not 
mentioned in Twitchell's book, was the archetype. He is not, however, inter-
ested in either cateogory of film: not in the "psycho-horrors" because "they 
always drive away the images of disorder and violence . .. to get at some ra-
tional explanation" and thus eliminate, he says, the lingering frisson so essen-
tial to horror art (recollectors of these films may disagree). And not in the 
invasion movies, because they lack the power and resonance of the Dracula 
et al. stories, since actual invasion (Le., sexual violation) is never a genuine 
pOSSibility in them. Both kinds of film, Twitchell asserts, are really terror, not 
horror, art. He argues that the most successful recent horror movies (Eraser-
head, The Texas Chainsaw Massacre, Friday the 13th, Halloween, and Night of 
the Living Dead, for example) are all versions of the basic vampire, Franken-
stein, and werewolf/transformation monster stories. 
A Romantics scholar, Twitchell argues that it was only during the Roman-
tic period that a horror monster different from all that had preceded it in lit-
erature was born: a monster who would not die, who could not be 
vanquished, and who was far more memorable and fascinating than his op-
ponents. The three featured creatures of Twitchell's book are rooted in Euro-
pean folk-lore but have their essential stories set down in the Gothic novel, 
whether early in the nineteenth century (Mary Shelley'S Frankenstein) or later 
on, when it began to edge toward the twentieth (Bram Stoker's Dracula and 
Robert Louis Stevenson's Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde). These writers' nightmarish 
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visions are born again and again in the movies, where, appropriately, one 
can dream with open eyes. 
What the adolescent "dreams" in the movie theater, Twitchell says, is a 
"tale of sexual confusion played out with implicit sexual directions," The 
horror movie terrifies, even sometimes sickens, because it offers sexual "scen-
arios that are possible, but forbidden"-incestuous scenarios, to be precise. 
The fear of incest "underlies all horror myths in our culture that are repeat-
edly told for more than one generation." It is incest, and incest alone, that so 
horrifies the adolescent audience. Noting that incest occurs in all societies, 
however, and that it has been openly practiced in some, and thus cannot be 
an instinctual taboo, Twitchell argues that "the 'grisly horror' of incest is so-
cially learned"-at the movies. (Drawing on Freud's primal horde theory-
described in his 1913 work, Totem and Taboo-as well as on the ideas of 
modem anthropologists and biologists, Twitchell asserts that a culture makes 
incest loathsome and terrifying not because it leads to genetic weaknesses 
and abnormalities but rather because it destroys the social order.) 
The primary flaw with Twitchell's argument is its circularity. If the incest 
taboo were not already deeply embedded in the adolescent's psyche, he or 
she would not find the violation of it in the movies such a "grisly horror." It 
may well be, in fact, that incest is not what is going on in all the horror mov-
ies adolescents undeniably hunger for, or not the only thing that is going on. 
Twitchell's thesis may ultimately say more about our society's current preoc-
cupation with incest and the sexual abuse of children than about the psycho-
logical subtext of the horror film. 
Twitchell sees, as I have said, incestuous themes all over the horror art he 
examines. But it seems to me that, without incest's being thrown in, sexuality 
contains, for the teenage audience, horror aplenty. For example, the adoles-
cent body alone-changing, uncontrollable, messy, leaky, plagued by anxie-
ties and urges, lacking the sturdy physical self-sufficiency of childhood-can 
be frightening and occasionally even loathsome to its possessor (an area of 
anxiety, as Stephen King and others have pointed out, powerfully embodied 
in the 1957 schlock classic, I Was a Teenage Werewolf.) To some American 
youngsters (as well as to some of their parents), sex itself has its horrifying 
aspects. And certainly, as a number of observers have pointed out, many 
horror movies are infused with a Puritanical morality-the sexual transgres-
sions of the characters (especially the females) are instantly punished by 
siashings, dismemberment, disembowelment, etc. In addition, horror movies 
often reflect the teenage audience's antagonism to the adult world and a 
sense of being victimized by it. Nor does Twitchell's thesis have room for 
other taboos violated by some of the most popular of these movies-necro-
philia, for instance. 
Dreadful Pleasures nonetheless offers many pleasures to its readers. Twitch-
ell's writing is lively, metaphorical, and skillful, and his breadth of reference 
impressive. His many asides-about the influence of Darwin on fin-de-siecle 
writers of horror, his logical (and unanswerable) question about why the gate 
in King Kong's wall is so large if he is not supposed to get out-are interest-
ing. Indeed, these asides may be the most interesting thing about his book. 
But students of the movies who want a pithier discussion of adolescent 
sexuality and the horror movie might prefer to tum instead to Walter Evan's 
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1973 essay "Monster Movies: A Sexual Theory" (Journal of Popular Film, Fall, 
1973). Despite its brevity, it manages to be more comprehensive than 
Twitchell's work. It discusses, to take only two instances, marriage as an im-
portant theme in horror movies and connects menstruation and the flowering 
of adult female sexuality to the Dracula myth. And it at least gives a nod, as 
Dreadful Pleasures does not, to other "readings" -political and philosophical 
-of the horror movies that adolescents, for a time, swarm to so compul-
sively. 
Long Island University, C. W. Post Campus Jonna G. Semeiks 
Reconstructing American Literary History edited by Sacvan Bercovitch. Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press,_ 1986. Pp. x + 351. $20.00, cloth; $8.95, 
paper. 
In a paper titled "America as Canon and Context: Literary History in a 
Time of Dissensus," published in American Literature (58 [1986], 99-107), 
Sacvan Bercovitch spells out some of the goals and assumptions that went 
into the making of this collection of twelve essays. He tells us that" ... it 
seems likely that we will not, thank God, arrive at some sweeping new syn-
thesis. I hope our History will set directions in American literary scholarship 
for the next generations; but I think it's safe to say that it will not lead them, 
like the fabled pillar of fire, out of the wilderness of difference, partiality, and 
debate into a Canaan of unmediated truth" (p. 107). When anyone speaks 
about setting "directions in American literary scholarship for the next genera-
tions," especially in a turbulent critical period like our own, we naturally 
may confess to some healthy skepticism. How is it possible to direct future 
generations when our literary theory and the history it inspires seems so 
directionless? In this collection of essays, Bercovitch anticipates this question 
and offers an ingenious response. In his Preface, he admits that ours is an 
age of "dis sensus," a time when " ... consensus of all sorts has broken down 
-broken down, worn out, or at best opened up .... It will be the task of the 
present generation to reconstruct American literary history by making a vir-
tue of dissensus" (pp. vii-viii). By making a "virtue of dissensus" or, in this 
case, making a volume of dissensus, Bercovitch's response to our question 
suggests that future generations of American literary scholars will be directed 
by what has come to be called after Bakhtin "dialogism," the dialogic chorus 
of voices that speak the different languages of social life. In Bercovitch's liter-
ary history, we should not expect direction from a single, unitary voice, for 
reconstructing American literary history-a postmodernist literary history-is 
a process radically different from anything we have encountered in the tradi-
tion of American literary scholarship, a tradition perhaps best represented by 
critics like Parrington and Spiller. Bercovitch seeks to displace the traditional-
ist notion of a unified and centered literary history with the post-modernist 
representation of a dialogic history that refutes closure and totalization. This 
volume, then, may be seen as a tentative first step toward a new kind of liter-
ary history, a history centered-if this is the right word-in discontinuity. In 
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a sense, Bercovitch reconstructs American literary history by deconstructing 
it. 
Each of the essays in this collection reflects Bercovitch's concern with the 
discontinuous nature of both history and historical discourse, Bercovitch tells 
us that the twelve contributors to this collection " ... represent no particular 
approach, school, or set of principles except the principles of excellence and 
balance. They were chosen for the quality of their work and for their diver-
sity of views and interests" (p. viii). All the contributors to this collection are 
well-known scholars. All already have made significant contributions to liter-
ary studies, and Bercovitch has succeeded admirably in finding contributors 
who are producing some of the most influential and important work in the 
areas of American literary history and literary theory. In fact, many of the es-
says in this collection represent the very best work yet produced by some of 
these scholars. 
The essays are arranged chronologically beginning with a discussion of Co-
lonial American polemical writing and ending with a discussion of Eliot's and 
Pynchon's historicism. This chronological arrangement may be somewhat 
deceptive in that the order might imply relation and continuity when no rela-
tion or continuity exists among the essays; they might have been arranged 
alphabetically or in some other order just as easily. Although no thematic re-
lation or overtly diachronic relation exists among them, the essays do share 
some fundmental similarities. As Bercovitch points out in his Preface, all are 
concerned with the problematics of history; all agree that textual analysis 
should be grounded in history; all seek out the underlying forces that give 
rise to critical debate and conflict, and all resist the totalizing, easy answer to 
complex historical questions. For the sake of our discussion here, the essays 
may be divided in three broad segments that follow Bercovitch's chronologi-
cal arrangement: four essays concern Colonial American literature and the 
American Renaissance; five essays treat modern American literature begin-
ning with Whitman and Dickinson; the final three essays discuss aspects of 
contemporary American literature. 
The first four essays in this collection establish the diversity of both critical 
methodology and subject matter that give this volume its character. The first 
essay, Robert A. Ferguson's" 'We Hold These Truths': Strategies of Control 
in the Literature of the Founders," takes what Ferguson calls a "textual ap-
proach" to the writings of the Founding Fathers, primarily the writings of 
Franklin, Paine, Jefferson, and Dickinson. Ferguson's textual approach at-
tempts to demonstrate how language serves a "hegemonic function" in colo-
nial America. He argues that "Theories of hegemony are useful because they 
stimulate descriptions on a different level. They resist the surface appeal of 
political rhetoric to concentrate on its pressures and limits .... We see how 
belief becomes language" (pp. 27-28). Ferguson's analysis, somewhat similar 
to Fredric Jameson's recent work, is an excellent example of what has been 
called "dialectical" criticism at its best. Morris Dickstein's "Popular Fiction 
and Critical Value: The Novel as a Challenge to Literary History" discusses 
canon formation and argues that the American literary canon should be ex-
panded to include the popular novel. He traces the appeal of the novel to the 
popular fiction of texts like Robinson Crusoe, and he shows how literary texts 
depend in part on popular literature for their conventions. Dickstein tells us 
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that "Not all popular culture is art, but no conception of how art and culture 
have interacted over the last two and a half centuries can be complete with-
out understanding the role it has played ... " (p. 66). In the third essay, Bar-
bara Packer in "Origin and Authority: Emerson and the Higher Criticism" 
reads Emerson against the background of the "higher criticism" represented 
by the tradition of German biblical scholarship. In her provocative reading, 
she understands Emerson to be a kind of nineteenth-century deconstruction-
ist: "With the notion of a poetry consisting of a perpetual play of tropes . 
Emerson is finally weaning himself from the concept of origins that had tan-
talized him for so long" (p. 87). In his poetics, Emerson "explodes" (Packer's 
term) the idea of origin and, to some extent, authority, too. The final essay is 
this segment, Eric j. Sundquist's "Benito Cereno and New World Slavery," 
analyzes Benito Cereno within the context of the great slave debates of the 
1850's. Sundquist explains: "Benito Cereno's general significance in the de-
bates over slavery in the 1850's is readily apparent ... Even so, the full im-
plications of Melville's invocatiori of Caribbean revolution have not been 
appreciated, nor the historical dimensions of his masquerade of rebellion 
completely recognized" (p. 94). In his reassessment of Benito Cereno, Sund-
quist shows how this text appropriates history while, at the same moment, it 
comments pn history. 
The next segment of five essays treats issues within the broad period we 
usually refer to as Modern American Literature. The first essay, Sandra M. 
Gilbert's "The American Sexual Poetics of Walt Whitman and Emily Dickin-
son," argues that Whitman and Dickinson were similar in that both wrote 
"not poetry," but their alienation from traditional poetic forms and themes 
reflected greatly different attitudes about the possibility of artistic expression, 
especially through what Gilbert calls "male-defined genres." "Clearly," she 
tells us, "the composition of 'not poetry' has facilitated composition for both 
male and female Americans during the last century. But it seems just as clear 
that that work has been structured for men through allusions to genres 
whose contours reemphasize the winning of art" (p. 153). Gilbert demon-
strates that a sexual poetics possesses a diachronic dimension that helps ex-
plain the evolution of genres as well as reveal the restrictive and constraining 
role that generic thinking plays on artistic consciousness. Philip Fisher in 
"Appearing and Disappearing in Public: Social Space in Late-Nineteenth-
Century Literature and Culture" also investigates the latent social forces that 
guide artistic creation. He argues that "appearing" or "conspicuousness" and 
"disappearing" or "privacy" helped to guide both aesthetic and economic 
endeavors during the era of capitalist expansion in America. Fisher's analysis 
of this era, like Foucault's history writing, uncovers a social dynamic, a dy-
namic of difference, that opens up history to show new relations among 
seemingly disparate social acts. Like Fisher, Walter Benn Michaels in "Corpo-
rate Fictions: Norris, Royce, and Arthur Machen" offers yet another provoca-
tive cultural critique. He shows how naturalism, especially the naturalism 
represented by the writings of Norris, Royce, and Machen, actually conspires 
with the corporation while it seemingly protests against the social injustice 
perpetrated by the corporation. He explains that "Here is perhaps the deep-
est complicity between naturalism and the corporation. In naturalism, no per-
sons are natural. In naturalism, personality is always corporate and all 
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fictions, like souls metaphorized in bodies, are corporate fictions" (p. 219). In 
his discussion of the inherent contradictions within naturalism, Walter Benn 
Michaels supplies us with an important rereading of texts that have been 
read for too long as straightforward critiques of social injustice. Frank Len-
tricchia in "On the Ideologies of Poetic Modernism, 1890-1913: The Example 
of William james" finds james to be " ... particularly invaluable for the con-
temporary scene in critical theory because he is capturable by no one of its 
orthodoxies and because he is a counterforce to the antitheoretical opportun-
ism that is being promoted in his name by those in theory who are weary of 
theory and by those outside theory who have hated theory from the begin-
ning" (p. 248). Lentricchia argues that james, through the influence of Emer-
son, developed a "radical pragmatism" that rejects the "imperialist 
imposition" of much contemporary American literary schOlarship. In the final 
essay in this segment, Werner Sollors in "A Critique of Pure Pluralism" 
argues against a pure pluralism in literary studies. Through a discussion of 
the life and writings of Horace Meyer Kallen, Sollors addresses the problem 
of ethnogenesis in relation to canon formation, especially the "monoethnic 
myths of origins" that result from a traditional "mosaic of ethnic stories." In-
stead of the pure pluralism of the American literary tradition, Sollors advo-
cates a dynamic ethnogenesis: "If we approach American literature, ethnic or 
mainstream, with an awareness of the dynamic nature of ethnogenesis, we 
might arrive at an understanding of writing as more than a reflection of ethn-
ically diverse 'experiences' (p. 275). It is through the "dynamic nature of eth-
nogenesis" that American literary history may "go beyond pure pluralism." 
The final three essays in this collection address topics concerning contem-
porary American literature. Robert Von Hallberg in "American Poet-Critics 
since 1945" maintains that "The severing of relations between poet-critics 
and academic critics has brought the greater loss to the professors . .. " (p. 
296). Poets who are also literary critics in the tradition of Eliot and Pound 
have much to teach us about the act of criticism, especially in the area of 
evaluation. The second essay in this segment, Robert B. Stepto's "Distrust of 
the Reader in Afro-American Narratives," employs an insightful reader-re-
sponse analysis to show that " ... distrust of the American reader prompted 
Douglass and Wright to write, and affeeled the choices they made regarding 
what they would write about" (p. 303). Stepto argues that the reader helps to 
author the text, and he attempts to move beyond Stanley Fish and Steven 
Mailloux by providing a model for the classification of the Afro-American 
framed tale. Finally, in what is perhaps the most inspired essay in this collec-
tion, Wendy Steiner in "Collage or Miracle: Historicism in a Deconstructed 
World" sees The Waste Land and The Crying of Lot 49 as companion texts 
where "The Crying of Lot 49 is a wholesale rewriting of The Waste Land for 
the purpose of reopening the issues that that poem raised and recasting them 
in the postmodernist context" (pp. 323-24). She maintains that "Eliot's his-
tory involved the recovery of determinate knowledge, a sense of culture that 
only the right immersion in past culture could create . ... But for Pynchon 
the quest is not to be imagined as a determinate beginning-middle-end struc-
ture, but a continuity of ever enlarging hypothesis and data, punctuated by 
miracle" (p. 350). Steiner's reading of The Waste Land and The Crying of Lot 
49 is a fast ride, exciting and exhilarating. 
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Taken as a whole, this volume's contribution to literary studies is two-fold. 
First, each essay in its own right constitutes an important contribution to spe-
cialized scholarship. For example, I cannot imagine that Pynchon research or 
research concerning the Afro-American narrative or research in naturalism or 
research in any of the specialized areas covered by this collection could be 
complete without reference to the individual essays offered here. These es-
says will stimulate literary and historical debate for many years to come, and 
I predict that some will become standard critical texts in their areas of spe-
cialization. Obviously, more needs to be said about each individual essay 
than I have said here, and I feel certain that in the years to come, they will 
collect their own, more complete critical histories. The second and perhaps 
greater contribution of this volume is the example it provides for a postmod-
ernist literary history. Certainly, great debate will follow this book in both 
the interpretative communities of literary history and literary theory, and this 
volume's value as a literary history that may "set directions in American lit-
erary scholarship for the next generations" will be settled there. However, at 
this particular historical moment, I do not believe that it is exaggeration to 
say that this book has set the standard by which other literary histories will 
be measured, and for Americanists, it is one book that accurately fits the ac-
colade "indispensable." 
Iowa State University Thomas Kent 
"A White Heron" and the Question of Minor Literature by Louis A. Renza. 
Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984. Pp. xxi + 221. $19.95. 
Louis Renza's study of Sarah Orne Jewett appears in the new University of 
Wisconsin Project on American Writers. Edited by Frank Lentricchia, it will 
consist largely of post-structuralist revisions of American literary history and 
interpretation, and promises to incorporate a range of Marxist, deconstruc-
tionist, semiotic, new historical, phenomenological, and psychoanalytic per-
spectives. Its first two books, in fact, one by John Carlos Rowe on Henry 
James and now one by Renza, are most valuable for the new questions they 
raise, for the kinds of re-focusing of a tradition they invite, for their implica-
tions about the canon beyond the particular texts they address. 
The most useful context for the series is probably the set of English Insti-
tute Essays, The American Renaissance Reconsidered, recently edited by Walter 
Benn Michaels and Donald Pease. Although Wisconsin has begun with post-
Civil War writers, F. O. Matthiessen's definition of the American Renais-
sance, which the Institute essays take as their problematic, has for a half 
century governed to a great extent the academic vision of nineteenth-century 
American literature. The kinds of questions raised in that collection by Mi-
chaels, Pease, Tompkins, Arac, Sundquist, and Grossman are the ones that 
have been reshaping the re-vision of classic and canonical frameworks in 
American studies for the last ten years. Renza himself contributed a brilliant 
and clever essay on "Poe's Secret Autobiography" to that collection, and its 
message and method are of a piece both with his earlier UC-Irvine disserta-
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tion, "The Veto of the Imagination: A Theory of Autobiography," and with 
his study of Jewett in this recent book. In both cases his writer hovers on the 
boundary between minor and semi-canonical status (Matthiessen excluded 
Poe). As he says in his Prologue, "only a critical perspective able to focus on 
minor literature as a question" could address its quest "to elude such cri-
teria." Renza thereby can also address the kinds of rhetorical, ideological, 
and marketing issues that position American literary study within a fuller 
historical framework. 
Renza is as self-conscious about his own effort as he says Jewett and Poe 
aTe about theirs. On his first page a derogatory reference to the Twayne Se-
ries of United States Authors not only dismisses to ,a "critical limbo" the kind 
of categorization that that series encourages but also implies an intellectual 
superiority for the new series Renza inaugurates. The next reference-to Les-
lie Fiedler-is not only part of Renza's analysis of earlier perspectives on 
"minor" literature but also an explicit connector to a strong predecessor of 
another day who tried to alter radically the established assumptions for 
American studies. Similarly the analysis of Northrop Frye is partIy a signal 
for superseding an earlier system in which minor writing was part of "a non-
competitive mode of literary production." 
The critic to whom Renza seems most attached, however, is Roland 
Barthes, for in one sense "A White Heron" and the Question of Minor Literature 
is a kind of post-structuralist S/Z. Renza begins by reprinting a semi-canoni-
cal tale, and then systematically explores a series of codes by means of which 
the tale communicates. Instead, however, of explaining a set of codes as a 
structure for literary communication in the 1880s, Renza shifts to a series of 
critical frameworks and codes by means of which academic critics of the 
1980s are changing the very questions to be asked about "A White Heron." 
After a theoretical introduction on "the question of minor literature," Renza 
writes four chapters revolving sequentially around regionalist, feminist, pas-
toral-generic, and rhetorical issues <all cleverly titIed-" A White Heron" as a 
Maine current, as a nun-such, as a rare bird of pastoral, as a pre/text). By 
problematizing canonicity and "minority," he of course runs the risk of slip-
page between academic critics' establishment of major/minor distinctions 
and writers' sense of their own projects. Because he wants to address both is-
sues, or really to turn scholars' continual awareness of the former into a new 
awareness of the latter, he freely moves between the two. A reader may feel 
the categories themselves have been idealized, as in a sense they have while 
Renza seeks to undermine a competitive process of canonicity, not merely to 
canonize "lost works" by minority writers but to establish" a minor criticism 
of minor literature [which} entails the critical intention to deny canonicity un-
self-consciously." 
While being ideologically more eclectic than it might at first seem, Renza 
does draw on Marxist theory to develop a model in which "minor" literature 
can elude its commodity status, as a debased article of exchange, in bourgeois 
culture; but also he tries to avoid when possible conventional Marxist exploi-
tation of minority stories as ideological pretexts. Perhaps Renza's favorite 
model is the Deleuze-Guattari study of Kafka, which posits minor literature 
as a "third-world" sort of thing, alienated from its dominant culture, a "schi-
zo" literature that "sabotages whatever social or systematic code happens to 
a 
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control the means of major literary production at the moment." The De-
leuzian model, however, may be the least appropriate for Renza's own proj-
ect. 
Overall the theoretical introduction and four interpretive chapters mesh 
well, perhaps since not the tightness of the book but its serial insights are its 
strength. Nor does it need to suffer from the usual disease of books on minor 
writers, apologetically arguing for canonical status. Renza is good at analyz-
ing the unresolvable tensions and equivocations beneath the apparently 
placid text, the ways in which allusions and images and characterizations in-
duce their own misreadings, and Jewett's deferral of social meaning through, 
for example, use of a child protagonist. He puts the text in a feminist context 
without reducing it to the status of feminist document, and effectively uses 
Lacan's notion of "writing" to illustrate the story's dispersal of an otherwise 
explicit paternal position, understood most clearly by comparing the story to 
Jewett's novel, A Country Doctor. Renza connects the tale with pastoral prede-
cessors such as Thoreau and Audubon, showing how it both "affiliates" itself 
with that tradition and also "demotes" its own affiliation. Finally, with refer-
ence to Hawthorne as a significant sketcher-predecessor, he examines Jew..: 
ett's techniques and ambition to realize a freedom to become a uminor" 
writer (in a non-competitive sense) of a nondialectical species of literature. It 
is only in this final chapter that one begins to feel the Jewett of the 1880s 
may have lost her self in being taken over by the Renza of the 1980s. 
Renza's book is not primarily an introduction to Sarah Orne Jewett, nor 
really a resolution of questions about minor literature. His categories would 
hardly hold if Robert Grant or John William DeForest or Mrs. E. D. E. N. 
Southworth were under the microscope. In fact, "A White Heron" at times 
seems to Renza's essay what Oedipus Rex was to Aristotle's Poetics-the 
uniquely suitable text for an innovative critical model. Renza's book, how-
ever, does provide intelligent, original insights into relationships between 
important, once culturally marginal texts and both the culture in which they 
were produced and consumed and the cultures that have continued to read 
and mis-read them. Renza's book is also a useful paradigm for remapping re-
lationships between canonicity and marginal texts in America, and despite 
Renza's frequent delight in his own cleverness, it is one of the more thought-
ful recent post-structuralist essays on American writing. 
North Carolina State University John E. Bassett 
The Post-Modern Aura: The Act of Fiction in an Age of Inflation by Charles 
Newman. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1985. Pp. 200. $24.95, 
cloth; $9.95, paper. 
This is an important book, for a number of reasons; still, reading Charles 
Newman brought to mind a favorite saying of my father's-one he applied 
to chronic complainers. "Some people," he used to say, "wouldn't be happy 
if you hung them with a new rope." In some ways, Newman is one of those 
people, and he's not happy, for all the old familiar reasons: "Our real ene-
J 
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mies remain the old-fashioned, intractable ones: concentrations of economic 
and political power which have become inflexible; careerism and boredom; 
the cynicism of the producer of cultural goods, and the genuine bewilder-
ment of the consumer," The question is what one ought to do for our sick so-
ciety until the doctor comes. And in this respect, The Post-Modern Aura will 
remind readers of Gerald Graff, whose Literature Against Itself Newman fre-
quently cites. The advice is pretty familiar, by now, to anybody who has 
lived, or worked, through the Lit Wars of the last twenty years. 
Which is not to say that the Newman/Graff analysis isn't any good. Some 
people don't like it, but the indictment still happens to fit: " ... both the criti-
cal and the aesthetic intelligence often relinquish their traditional claims, pre-
ferring to explore what they imagine to be the richness of their own 
limitations,/I Given that state of affairs, it's reasonable to adopt a consumerist 
attitude toward the Franco-American canned goods we've been gobbling in 
such large amounts. "My point," Newman says, "is not to defend contempo-
rary literature as much as to ask why we have made such a poor case for it . 
. . . I stick to theory not because I think it conspicuously related to practice or 
even intrinsically interesting, but because I find contemporary culture so will-
fully theoretical. This should not be surprising in a culture which is disinte-
grating. .." And the primary cause of this disintegration, as the title 
suggests, is the sustained, inflationary "rocket ride" we've been on. Over 
against the ahistoricism, the irony, the textualist posturings of post-modern 
flux, Newman places the fixed standard of "culture," which he speaks of not 
in an anthropological sense, but in the anti-inflationary sense of that other 
Newman-John Henry-and of Matthew Arnold. 
On behalf of culture, or its representation, Charles Newman wants, reason-
ably enough, a reconciliation of formalism and realism, such as Raymond 
Williams-in somewhat different tenns-began asking for at least thirty 
years ago. And like Williams, he finds it impossible to make any progress ex-
cept in light of material considerations: "If we are to have a new literary his-
tory, it will have to deal with the new agencies of production, transmission, 
and administration of knowledge as dominant cultural institutions. It will 
have to be skeptical of all claims to autonomy, as well as the use of literature 
alone as a means of cultural, much less literary diagnosis." As this descrip-
tion implies, the "critics," particularly academic ones, come in for a good deal 
of responsibility (and bashing) because "if the literary community is to sur-
vive it must reconstitute itself, not in terms of a stylized adversary but by re-
covering its own structural integrity." With so many people spending so 
much of their time trying to take the culture and its language apart-in one 
modish way or another-it's no wonder that we're in our present, post-
modern fix, particularly since the de-constructing usually goes on at the place 
in our society, the academy, which is supposed to represent the coherent 
"life" of culture. As I said this is pretty familiar stuff, though Newman states 
his pOSition with a great deal of force; and his discussion of inflation is both 
new and arresting. He finds no value in the polysemous multiplicity of signi-
fication. In place of semiotic richness, he sees merely an empty proliferation, 
which is the death of aesthetic, as well as fiscal, standards. In such an envi-
ronment, critical judgment does in fact become a lie. 
If that's all there was to this book, no harm done. Culture requires the per-
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severance of enlightened, eloquent complainers if it is to be meaningfully 
preserved, particularly when the ropes we've been given to hang ourselves 
by all look so used, despite what we're told to the contrary. What Newman 
offers, though, is a lot more than a mere rounding up of the usual suspects, 
thanks to the writerly project he has set out for himself: "As this is a cultural 
history of recent attitudes, rather than a specifically literary argument, there is 
little textual explication." He's as good as his word. A few of the twenty-four 
chapters do read almost like "regular" essays, though as he says, there's of-
ten very little quoted evidence or argumentative "development." 
For the most part, Newman has other objectives in mind; he is concerned 
with his announced-and ultimately post-modern-subject of attitude. His 
pieces vary in length from fifty pages to only two or three, with most being 
shorter, rather than longer. The discussion revolves around such concerns as 
one might expect: universities, the novel, contemporary writers, the literary 
marketplace, criticism, and so on. Typically, Newman does not work to dem-
onstrate his materials, however, in any programmatic way. In chapter ten, 
while discussing realism, he offers the following insight into his method: 
IJ • •• If we are prepared to accept meaning which is not 'immanent' in history 
or language, and hence not strictly discoverable, but the fruit of an ongoing if 
finally inexplicable collaboration between the mind and the world, then we 
can project upon human history the only meaning it can possibly have-
which is precisely what literature aims for in its extra-historical, extra-cul-
tural, and extra-psychological assertiveness. In such a situation, the reader is 
challenged to be sure, but the idea is to captivate the reader by whatever 
means necessary." Newman is a novelist, first of all, most recently the author 
of White Jazz, and he's trying to make the world safe for his kind of work: 
he's out to change people's attitude, to "captivate" the readers he needs to 
get his job-the job of imaginative language-done. And more often than 
not, I think he succeeds. 
He manages to tum his text (and surprisingly, with it, lit-crit) into a good, 
even an important, read. Newman sees through the text, of course, as we all 
now know we are bound to do, but instead of empty space, he finds the real 
world (minus quotation marks), regardless of how sorry the sight may be: "A 
general culture glut opens the present to a limitless eclecticism and disarms 
taste by making everything 'interesting.' And, as the critic Charles Newman 
argues in the most provocative book on this problem yet ,_written by an 
American . .. its net effect is inflation: the permeability the past has acquired 
is the natural ground of hype in the presen!." This assessment of the book 
comes not from an academic, but from Robert Hughes, writing in Time maga-
zine (17 June 1985, p. 80). When's the last time you read a "professional" 
critic who got talked about there (excepting, of course, Umberto Eco and the 
designer crits from Yale)? It is a measure of Newman's success, and the suc-
cess of his captivating method, that he should get taken up and used by a 
news weekly, in an article about the contemporary art scene, which he does 
not engage directly himself. Of course, he got "real" praise from expectable 
sources, which is well and good. But usually, such praise serves more as an 
epitaph than an introduction, particularly for academic publications. 
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That doesn't seem to be the case with Newman, though, and I hope his 
book continues to succeed, in a more than merely academic way, because the 
ideas in it matter, along with their mode of presentation. It might be possible 
to summarize his project in terms of literary modernism, and what has be-
come of it once it got institutionalized in a post-modern, inflationary acad-
emy: "In a time when the intellectualization of a society seems to go hand in 
hand with the bureaucratization of culture, and the Academy has failed ut-
terly as an alternative to commercialism, except to exploit it as a unifying 
scapegoat, it is difficult for any writer to have much faith in any reinstitution-
alization of literature," Nevertheless, Newman's goal, as a writer, is to imag-
ine an alternative, uninflationary space within which the bad faith of the past 
can be gotten over. If his method is more performative than discursive, that 
is only to be expected, since traditional, "critical intelligence" is what got us 
into this fix in the first place, and if we are to get out of it, new methods will 
be required. 
Obviously, the question remains, as to whether middle-class Americans-
in or out of the academy-want an institutional culture, and a post-decon-
structionist canon. In either case, though, the institutions we have now are 
surely anachronistic, if not an out and out lie, which is Newman's point. 
Either the university is supposed to represent the best that is thought and 
said, in something like Arnold's sense; or else it is our job to free society 
from the arbitrary orthodoxy of traditional "culture." If the first is true, a 
great many of us are accepting salaries under false pretenses. If the second is 
true, we are wasting our time, since the average freshman already knows 
more about post-modem anomie-as lived experience-~han we'll ever be 
able to teach. And she/he-unlike us-didn't have to get over the Norton 
Anthology to arrive at that knowledge, which is what Newman has in mind 
when he refers to the middle class as the ultimate avant garde of late capital-
ist society. This may be why academics-still laboring under modernist as-
sumptions about us and them-remain so vindictively obsessed with the 
post-humous dismantling of a "tradition" that doesn't amount to a hill of 
beans, once you cross the street from the campus. We're like the Victorian 
"freethinkers" who couldn't stop talking about God. 
It is this contradictory state of affairs, I expect, that accounts for Newman's 
method. He's trying to imagine, to implicate, a necessarily indistinct future; 
and he's trying to jumpstart the critical idiom he'll need to get from here to 
there. For the most part, his pieces read like journal entries, the style of 
which-not to mention their situation-reminds me of Coleridge: there are 
wonderful insights, great phrases, but comparatively little straight exposition. 
It's possible to dispute his judgments. For instance, when he gets going on 
contemporary "hig" writers, he confines himself essentially to Bellow, Gass, 
and Barthelme. The conclusions he reaches fit them, I suppose, but having 
said what he does about our need for a new realism, I couldn't help wonder-
ing why Newman ignores the work of people like Evan S. Connell, Robert 
Stone, or Russell Banks. But these are minor quibbles. 
The real pleasure of this text lies in the reading, and in the suggestiveness 
of Newman's observations. As an illustration, consider these examples, culled 
pretty much at random: 
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Effecting a siege without an enemy, contemporary fiction defensively 
attempts to reassert its old imperatives, but without mimetic preten-
sions. This produces not so much the imperial novel, but a full appro-
priation of a verbal universe which one might uncharitably call 
hysterification, or the overwrought novel-what we will call absolutist 
fiction. 
Against the mindless misappropriation of the metaphors of modem sci-
ence, we [readers of such contemporary writers as Ann Beattie] get the 
concrete in the form of tennis shoes and the mandatory beer poured 
over the head. Against a cost overrun linguistics, we get rent-controlled 
vernacular. 
TV is total Aristotle, and it is story at all costs, not realism per se, which 
becomes the characteristic expression of contemporary bourgeois soci-
ety. 
What we are dealing with here [in contemporary culture] is the 
preemption by the media of the writer as celebrity. The talk show is, af-
ter all, an attempt to create through instantaneous exposure what was 
once mythology or at least romantic rumor. 
One could say that a culture which has so effortlessly assimilated the 
cultural habadashery of Freud, Marx and Einstein, should have no 
problem with a few literary fireworks; our century has accustomed us 
to art which takes off like a rocket and comes down like a stick. 
It's not that I wish I could write like Newman, exactly. Sometimes, his allu-
siveness does become difficult. What I do wish is that more of "us" shared 
his obvious concern for language as something more than special effects, and 
his admirable wish to make literature, and literary intelligence, more than a 
purely academic matter. 
Wayne State University Jerry Herron 
Critique of Commodity Aesthetics: Appearance, Sexuality and Advertising in Cap-
italist Society by Wolfgang Fritz Haug. Eighth Edition. Translated by Robert 
Bock. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986 [1971; 1983]. Pp. viii 
+ 185. $35.00, cloth; $14.95, paper. 
Few people will notice this long-overdue publication in English of Wolf-
gang Fritz Haug's pioneering study. Still fewer will read it. But Critique of 
Commodity Aesthetics has proved to be such a seminal work wherever it has 
been available that its English-language readers, no matter how few, may 
find themselves disseminating radically influential conceptions. 
Given the philosophic density of the original German, Robert Bock's lucid 
and sometimes elegant translation succeeds in making Haug's innovative 
theory accessible. Bock's scrupulous avoidance of sexist construct~ons (such 
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as exclusively male pronouns) does, however, introduce occasional solecisms 
that could have been avoided by using the plural more adroitly. 
One reason for the fifteen-year delay in Haug's advent into our discourse 
may be the staunch resistance of Anglo-American empiricism to such una-
bashedly theoretical methodology. Indeed, to comprehend his achievement, 
one must be clear about how Haug's aims and methods differ from more fa-
miliar explorations of appearance, sexuality, and advertising in capitalist soci-
ety. 
This is not muck-raking, a la Vance Packard or Wilson Bryan Key. Haug 
mostly leaves to empirical verification the fact that advertising falsifies its 
wares, debases and perverts human desires, and manipulates the public. Nor 
is Haug's approach historical, like Stuart Ewen's fine 1976 account of the 
emergence and ideology of the modern American advertising industry, Cap-
tains of Consciousness: Advertising and the Social Roots of the Consumer Culture. 
Haug's far more audacious goal is to reveal why and how "an unrestrained 
economic function of capitalism is sweeping across the sensual world with 
the fury of a natural disaster, destroying everything that does not acquiesce, 
and assimilating and expanding certain features it comes across into a posi-
tion of domination in order to strengthen and secure the domination of capi-
tal" (p. 108). 
The term "commodity aesthetics," which Haug coined in his 1963 essay 
"On the Aesthetics of Manipulation," yokes two contradictory aspects of the 
"beauty" or sensual appeal of commodities. From one side, their beauty lies 
in the eyes of the beholder, the prospective buyer whose desires are aroused. 
From the opposite side, their beauty is an artifice of the seller, who designs 
commodities to stimulate the desire to possess and the impulse to buy. 
But why do we find particular commodities sensually appealing, stimulat-
ing, attractive, desirable, that is, in the broadest sense, beautiful? If, like a 
small child, we kept asking "why," demanding deeper and deeper levels of 
explanation, we might eventually arrive at an understanding of how eco-
nomic relations characteristic of late capitalism necessarily redefine aesthetic 
reality. Haug, however, works from the opposite direction. 
Instead of beginning with the cultural phenomena he wishes to explore, 
Haug unfolds them from their fundamental economic relations: "The task I 
set myself ... was to derive the phenomena of commodity aesthetics from 
their economic basis and to develop and present them within their systematic 
connections" (p. 8). Proceeding rigorously from the Marxist theory of value, 
he shows how the core of the elaborate global environment of commodity 
aesthetics lies in the act of commodity exchange itself. 
Once the cash nexus becomes central to this exchange, illusion becomes an 
increasingly important aspect of the commodity. The buyer seeks the com-
modity to satisfy some real or perceived need, to obtain its use-value. But the 
buyer is actually motivated by " 'the aesthetic promise of use-value,' that is, 
by the use-value I subjectively promise myself on the basis of what the com-
modity objectively promises me" (p. 144). To the seller, however, any actual 
use-value is inconsequential; all the seller wants is to realize the exchange-
value of the commodity, that is, to convert it into money. So the seller seeks 
to maximize the apparent use-value of the commodity, and "the commodity's 
promise of use-value" becomes "the aesthetic illusion" (p. 17). Since only the 
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appearance of use-value is important in effecting a commodity exchange, "the 
sensual appearance and the conception of its use-value" become "detached 
from the object itself" (pp. 16-17). The appearance of the commodity then 
becomes practically more important than its being: "This is the starting-point, 
the seed from which the ever-more-complex illusory world of commodity 
aesthetics developed and from which it is growing daily" (p. 144). 
The buyers do have real needs, Haug insists, however much these needs 
are manipulated, perverted, or even created by commodity aesthetics, and 
they must feel that these needs will be met by the commodities they buy. In-
deed, for capitalism to keep developing, the buyers must become needier and 
needier. Therefore, commodity aesthetics aims to denounce, devalue, and re-
place all that the buyers already possess, including their own bodies. The 
human body itself is redefined as a commodity that must continually be re-
packaged to satisfy the demands of a fetishistic cult of youth and beauty. Al-
ways promising to make life easier and more pleasant, commodity aesthetics 
keeps creating an exploiting new dependencies (Haug only briefly touches on 
phYSiological addiction, such as to tobacco, caffeine, sugar, alcohol, and other 
drugs). Attempts, particularly by youth, to set up dissenting subcultures are 
soon expropriatedi Haug might have cited the most striking example, the 
transformation of the work jeans and western jeans of the civil-rights and 
anti-war protest movements into designer jeans, complete with advertising 
logo. 
Haug argues that this process of constantly remolding human sensuality, 
with its goal of total control, has "a totalitarian tendency" (p. 91). It is hard 
to dispute this assertion in the glittering light of the shopping-mall ethos that 
has been extending its realm in the fifteen years since the first edition of Cri-
tique of Commodity Aesthetics. Illusion and fantasy have come to occupy the 
center of political life, while the compulsive quest for self gratification 
through commodities now seems to be approaching outright narcissism. The 
most terrifying aspect of Haug's analysis is his vision of the "direct anthro-
pological power and influence" of this aesthetic innovation, which "contin-
ually changes humankind as a species in their sensual organization, in their 
real orientation and material lifestyle, as much as in the perception, satisfac-
tion and structure of their needs" (p. 44). 
Social needs are trampled as people act out their lives under the illusion 
that human freedom consists of the individual's liberty to acquire all the 
commodities one desires. The individual feels and believes that this compul-
sive buying comes from his or her own free choice, and is blinded to its role 
in a much larger deSign. Haug's splendid metaphor for this is the picture on 
the jacket of this volume, which shows the famous fiock of pigeons at St. 
Mark's Square in Venice spelling out COCA COLA in huge letters. Like the 
workers and "consumers" of capitalist society, the pigeons are merely satisfy-
ing their hunger. However, "the seed was not scattered to feed the pigeons" 
but to use them in an advertising design "totally alien and external to pi-
geons": "While they are consuming their feed, capital is subsuming, and con-
suming, them" (p. 118). 
The transformation of human beings into consumers, according to Haug, 
perfects the alienation and exploitation of the working class: "Now they give 
up their life and strength in labor, in exchange for an illusory use of their 
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own life" (p. 96). But here Haug's analysis encounters major problems. Con-
vincing the producers that they are in essence "consumers" has indeed been 
a great coup for capitalism, as brilliantly dramatized in such literature as 
Frederik Pohl and Cyril Kornbluth's now-classic 1953 novel The Space Mer-
chants and J. G. Ballard's 1963 story "The Subliminal Man." But not all con-
sumers are workers, and not all workers can afford to do much consuming. 
An accurate analysis of the economic basis of commodity aesthetics must 
take a global view. After all, the majority of West German, French, British, 
and U.S. consumers did not in fact expend their lives producing most of the 
clothing, watches, electronic baubles, housewares, and other goodies they are 
buying. These were produced largely by "Third World" labor, both manufac-
turing workers (as in Mexico, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, Bra-
zil, the Philippines, Haiti, Turkey, Hong Kong, El Salvador, and India) and 
extractors of Taw materials (as in South Africa, Nigeria, Indonesia, Chile, Bo-
livia, Iraq, and Zaire). Some workers do not fit Haug's description of alien-
tated labor because they materially benefit from the superprofits of 
imperialism, while many more members of the working class, including the 
working poor and the unemployed around the world, do not fit this descrip-
tion because they cannot afford to buy the products advertised as essential to 
happiness. If this is true, Haug's argument exaggerates the role of aesthetic il-
lusion in forming consciousness and ideology, while minimizing the effects 
of material affluence or deprivation. In simple terms, those people able to 
buy an abundance of commodities have little material motive to share the 
revolutionary aspirations of the materially impoverished. 
Certainly Haug's intentions are revolutionary. He postulates no idyllic past 
ruined by capitalist commodity aesthetics. His project is quite contradictory 
to the reformist message of exposes such as Packard's The Hidden Persuaders 
and Key's Subliminal Seduction, which assume that capitalist advertising 
should be truthful. Haug demonstrates that since the economic contradictions 
of capitalism demand that what is promised from commodities must more 
and more exceed what they deliver, an aesthetic that negates truth becomes 
more and more essential to the survival of capitalism. The demand that 
beauty should not betray truth could be met only by a more advanced eco-
nomic system that resolves the contradictions of capitalism. So of course so-
cialism is Haug's prescription for a less alienating aesthetic environment. 
Even most of those who do not go along with his political premises or con-
clusions would agree that we live in an environment dominated by commod-
ity production and exchange, and would probably concede that this might 
have something to do with our sensual understanding of what is beautiful. 
That helps to explain why Haug's Critique of Commodity Aesthetics has been 
so hotly debated in Europe and suggests that this edition may prove equally 
vital to discussion of aesthetic theory and practice in the English-speaking 
world. 
Rutgers University, Newark H. Bruce Franklin 
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Irony and Ethics in Narrative: From Schlegel to Lacan by Gary j. Handwerk. 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985. Pp. ix + 231. $21.00 
One should not be misled by the title into expecting this book to be about 
the characteristics and workings of narrative. Narrative literature, from Fried-
rich Schlegel's Luzinde to Samuel Beckett's How It is provides much of the 
subject-matter, but the book is about irony, that elusive topic on which one is 
well-advised to eschew the desire to have the last word. So it is very appro-
priate that Gary Handwerk's absorbing and important essay should be with-
out a formal conclusion; for what it most cogently does is to display, with as 
much clarity as so difficult a topic will admit, why, in spite of our desire for 
last words and our proclivity for producing them, there can be no last words. 
Irony will always tUrn its powers on a last word and ironize it. Irony, in 
short, is self-generating and limitless; it can only produce local closures at the 
cost of opening onto endless symbolic networks. As an intersubjective phe-
nomenon, it deals in what I would call the "unreadability" of discourse, and 
as a result can be understood-this is Handwerk's first major thesis-as a 
"manifestation of a more basic concern with defining the nature of the hu-
man subject" (p. viii). That is why it is ironically appropriate that the book's 
very title is open to misreading: that meaning is subject to intersubjective ne-
gotiation and hence liable to undergo slippage is both the condition of possi-
bility for irony and the reason its critique of the "subject" is so corrosive. 
Clearly what is at issue here is not simply the rhetorical device frequently 
described as saying one thing and meaning another. What it means to mean, 
and what the conundrums of effectuating a meaning imply about the "na-
ture" (unironic word) of the human subject are the issues. "Local" ironies 
immediately open up philosophical questions of the kind that so vex and 
bewilder contemporary theory; and one understands the force of Handwerk's 
linking of Beckett, that tireless contemporary disintegrator of certainties, with 
Schlegel, as the "inventor," if one will, of "Romantic," i.e. modern irony. For 
it is a very modem, and indeed (whatever the sense of that unspecific and 
abused term) postmodern view of irony that is taken in this book; so that the 
other major linkage that forms its intellectual backbone is that of Schlegel 
with Jacques Lacan. Read against Schlegel, Lacan emerges, not so surpris-
ingly, perhaps, as a major theorist of irony, while Schlegel, with a touch 
more provocation, appears under the Lacanian eclairage as an ethical thinker, 
a thinker of "community." I will not say-that would be too much like a last 
word-that this is a Lacanian theory of irony; but the book shows what can 
be made of Romantic irony when it is cast in the light of the Lacanian "de-
construction" of the subject. 
Of course, as Handwerk suggests, one should really speak not of irony but 
of ironies, or of kinds of irony. Not only is there a distinction worth making 
between local and global-or rhetorical and philosophical-irony (even 
though such distinctions break down upon examination, each "kind" of irony 
implying the other). But Handwerk distinguishes, very usefully, between four 
different "emphases" within the overall concept of irony that one can find in 
Schlegel. Dialogic irony is contrastive, a denial of synthesis; systemic irony 
privileges the incompatibility of the manifold and the systematic; while ne-
gating (or Socratic) irony uses a tactic of particular negations to destroy the 
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concept of a structuring center. And then, finally, there is "the sort that is 
uniquely Schlegelian" (p. 35), ethical irony. 
Ethical irony arises because, as an intersubjective practice, irony is the lo-
cus of a double splitting. "Within" the subject, there is a split between the 
saying and the said, the meant and the way of meaning; and, just as one can 
on occasion be witty without intending to, so one can have the experience of 
being ironic without having meant it. For the irony of a given subject-this is 
the second split-exists only as it is perceived by another, the act of commu-
nication being dependent on the latter's retrieval, in such insecure circum-
stances, of something "meant" for which there is, and can be, no guarantee. 
So irony, as Handwerk very perceptively points out, forces recognition that 
the allegedly coherent and autonomous subject is neither; but it also demon-
strates that in the recognition of otherness-the recognition that the other is 
a subject, and the subject is other than "itself"-lies a possibility, however 
paradoxical, of "community." And it is the emphasis on this latter possibility 
that constitutes the ethical aspect of irony: "only in the answer of its You can 
every I feel its own unity," as Schlegel put it (cited on p. 34). Or, more wit-
tily: "Not understanding comes most often not at all from lack of under-
standing but from lack of sense" (p. 43). 
One sees the relevance of Lacan's stress on the subject as constructed in 
the symbolic order and as constituted by its place in a network of relation-
ships with others; indeed, without Lacan, I am not sure that Schlegel could 
have been made to yield so clear, if paradoxical, a concept as "ethical irony" 
turns out to be. Certainly the chapter on Lacan is one of the most brilliant in 
Handwerk's book, even though it amounts to a "mere" paraphrase of the 
master's thought. Handwerk has a breathtaking ability to formulate with 
clarity the most difficult and elusive conceptions without himself slipping 
into either Lacanian manneredness or Schlegelian hinting and fragmentari-
ness. The Lacan chapter will, I believe, be widely admired for its lucidity and 
its supremely "pedagogical"-I mean the word in the best sense-organiza-
tion. 
On literary texts, I find Handwerk more pedestrian. Perhaps an element of 
excitement is lacking because most of them-apart from those already men-
tioned, the book discusses Heinrich von 0fterdingen, The Prelude, Sartor Resar-
tus and the novels of Meredith-are seen to fall short, in different ways and 
in different degrees, of "full" ethical irony, this being true even of Beckett 
and Novalis. But I must in any case make an exception for the delightful 
chapter on Meredith, the various blindnesses of whose characters are deftly 
delineated as failures to achieve the forms of relational or (my word) dialogi-
cal reality ("reality") that are constituted by ethical irony. 
The problem that, to my mind, arises from the book's tendency to grade 
texts on a scale of ironic realization, emerges from the fact that, if one follows 
Lacan, ethical irony is not so much an exceptional and rarely achieved mode 
of communication as it is exemplary of the conditions of (inter-)existence of 
human subjects. Since "intersubjective encounters will necessarily reveal 
ironic patterns" (p. 136), the only choice, as Handwerk points out, is between 
being consciously and unwittingly ironic. The ideal that Handwerk seeks is 
the consciously ironic text; but it seems strange that he should find it so in-
frequenty and so imperfectly realized in literature (the work of Beckett being 
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that which comes closest to the ideal). The fact is testimony, of course, to the 
strength of "Imaginary" perceptions of subjecthood and otherness, and of 
unironic understandings of communication, such as-incidentally-Hand-
werk's own extrordinarily orderly expository writing, which is ironic only in 
subtle ways, seems to subscribe to! But is it not probable that in literature the 
locus of irony is not so much where Handwerk looks for it-in its repre-
sented world of relationships between characters, including of course the nar-
rator-narratee relationship-but in the communictive act characteristic of the 
literary as a mode of discourse? 
Handwerk very rightly takes the Beckett industry to task for recuperative 
reading, and for succumbing to the temptation to "[master] the irony rustling 
through Beckett's works" (p. 184); and he is led to ask the all-important 
question: how then shall we read Beckett, since the Beckett text is not a "co-
herent whole"? But a prior question might well be: what is reading? Is it not 
a privileged example of ethical irony in action? Navalis, although his termi-
nology is misleadingly essentialistie, certainly seems to have thought of read-
ing as a matter of ironic intersubjectivity: "The true reader must be the 
extended author" (cited p. 43). A reader ceases to be an autonomous self and 
becomes an agency of textual realization, but the text is realized as a mode of 
meaning in which the "meant" can only be hazardously produced as a renvoi 
de signification occurring within a limitless symbolic network. The "subjects" 
here-Novalis' "author" and "reader"-are constituted solely as textual rela-
tions and in an "intersubjectivity" that enacts a mutual acknowledgement of 
otherness. And of course it matters not the least that most frequently reading 
occurs as an unconscious realization of the conditions of ethical irony, and 
only occasionally-perhaps only ideally, or theoretically?-as a "fully" self-
conscious ironic realization. 
Or does it matter? Handwerk's privileging of consciously ethical irony sug-
gests a certain lack of interest in the unconscious kind, and this lack of atten-
tion to difference is perhaps of a piece with his choice of the word "ethical" 
and the concept of community achieved through communication as the sub-
ject's "necessary interpenetration with otherness." Such concepts tend to 
obliterate political differences, a matter of some importance if one under-
stands that unwitting ethical irony is a name for authoritarian discourse, that 
is, discourse that is either mystified or mystifying, or both, in its suppression 
of the necessary recognition of otherness, discourse that is consequently both 
alienated and alienating. To dismantle the assumptions of such discourse is 
an urgent task, and one for which literary people, to whom the experience of 
"ethical irony" in the form of reading is an everyday and at least somewhat 
conscious occurrence, are uniquely qualified. To do it, we need Schlegel, La-
can and Beckett; and we need books like Gary Handwerk's. To admit to 
some disappointment that his book stops at the ethical is not to detract from 
its impressive scholarly and intellectual achievement. It is only to ask that 
there be a next step. 
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